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by G. W. Longanecker
My first premise is that in order to exercise
program control, you must have a controlla-
ble program, which is one that has been prop-
erly scoped technically, realistically sched-
uled, and adequately budgeted.
The first step in scoping a program is obtain-
ing a set of minimum performance require-
ments to meet the mission objectives. I know
that this is a difficult task, because your cus-
tomer is intent on achieving the maximum
possible performance. However, my recom-
mendation is to get an agreement with your
customer on the minimum requirements,
and then set the specifications to achieve a
reasonably increased level of performance.
This will allow for possible descoping actions
later in the program, should the need arise.
Since our programs nearly always involve
state-of-the-art technology, and with today's
emphasis on resource control, a good descop-
ing plan developed early in the program is
important to have in your back pocket.
The other two ingredients of a controllable
program are schedule and cost. The two are
very much interdependent and must be bal-
anced with the degree of risk deemed appro-
priate for the program. There has been a lot
of rhetoric on the subject of risk, especially in
recent years. However, in my 30 years with
the agency, I really didn't see much risk-
taking, even with the unmanned scientific
and applications satellite programs. Risk is
extremely difficult to quantify, especially
when you're dealing with single satellite pro-
grams. How do you explain a risk trade-off to
a group of space physicists who are commit-
ting possibly half of their professional ca-
reers to a single satellite mission?
My consummate goal was always mission
success. What this really boils down to is that
you need to have adequate schedule slack
and budget contingency to solve the inevita-
ble problems that will confront you along the
way. Headquarters must hold sufficient re-
serves to cover any changes in scope. This is
important enough to reiterate. The project
manager at the field Center budgets and con-
trols reserves for problem solving; the pro-
gram manager at Headquarters budgets and
controls reserves for scope changes. The last
line of defense is to descope the program.
As I said earlier, if you have set your specifi-
cations with some margin over the minimum
goals, you should have some room to descope
and still meet mission objectives. The real
challenge for a manager is that you probably
will have to make some descoping decisions
during the development phase so that you
have some remaining contingency for the
test and evaluation phase, mission oper-
ations, data collection and data processing.
Properly scoping a program requires that
sufficient studies be performed during the
definition phase. As a rule of thumb, four to
eight percent of the expected total run-out
cost of a program should be spent through
Phase B. In my experience, NASA is notori-
ous for skimping on definition-phase fun-
ding. When you skimp during Phase A and
Phase B, you have an open invitation to per-
formance, schedule and budget problems
during Phases C and D. As part of the pro-
curement planning process, you will develop
in-house a "should-cost" estimate for the pro-
gram. Your budget requests will be based on
this "should-cost" figure plus contingency.
Because of competition, you will most likely
negotiate a contract for less than the
"should-cost" estimate. The difference should
not be considered part of your contingency
for problem solving, but rather it represents
the additional funds required to realistically
perform the prescribed effort without prob-
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lems. Occasionally a contractor will propose
a scheme that should save some money, but
again my experience has been that you
should pay attention toyour "should-cost" es-
timate.
Beyond the programmatic obstacles to a con-
trollableprogram, the single biggest hard-
ware obstacle in my experience has been
piece parts. I can't remember a single pro-
gram (and I'velaunched 21 satellites)where
we didn't have problems with piece parts.
We'd design a circuit,breadboard it,test it
and then find that we couldn't get flight-
qualified versions of the parts. We also suf-
fered from being a small-volume user ofpiece
parts since most of our programs involved a
single satellite.The only advice I can offeris
to use standard parts as much as possible in
your designs, order your parts as early as
possible in the program, and look for second-
source suppliers for your criticalparts.Even
afterdoing allof the above, the odds are that
you willhave piece part delivery problems.
As for program control, there are many good
techniques and tools. Everything starts with
a good work breakdown structure (WBS).
You will have developed one during the defi-
nition phase and for the Phase C and D pro-
curement package and, subsequent to con-
tract award, will agree to the WBS with your
prime contractor. The WBS is the basis for
your schedule projection and budget esti-
mate. It must have sufficient granularity to
identify the critical elements or building
blocks of the program.
Your schedule must have slack identified at
critical points in the program. It is not suffi-
cient to carry all the slack in the period just
before the launch readiness date. This is es-
pecially true when you're dealing with inter-
governmental or international partners in a
cooperative program. In most cases you'll
find that the cooperating agencies have even
less flexibility to deal with schedule and bud-
get changes than we do in NASA. Once es-
tablished, the schedules can be tracked by
any number of computer-generated systems.
Critical paths are easily identified and
tracked. However, I advise you not to rely
solely on the automated schedule systems.
I've always found it useful to prepare a few
charts on critical elements that [ could up-
date manually to look for schedule trends.
My favorite is one that tracked on a monthly
basis, for a few selected milestones, the cur-
rently planned date versus the originally
scheduled date (Figure 1).
I would frequently find that I could apply the
slope of the trend for intermediate miles-
tones to forecast, the most probable comple-
tion date for a downstream event, even
though the contractor continued to forecast
the original event date. I found it easier to
look at my few graphs than to study the
computer-generated charts covering the
walls of the "war room." You have to keep a
perspective on the big picture.
The final element of program control that I
wish to discuss is a performance measure-
ment system (PMS), or earned value system,
which allows you to track progress versus ex-
pended resources compared to your plan. Es-
sentially all major contractors have a PMS
that they use for their programs. The key
word here is "use." Having a PMS in your
contract is a useless exercise if the contractor
is not actually using the system to help man-
age the program. Accordingly, you should
adopt the system your contractor is familiar
with, rather than insist on a similar but dif-
ferent system. Due to the nature of our busi-
ness, changes to the program baseline are to
be expected. Obviously, such changes should
be kept to the absolute minimum, but when
it's unavoidable, any significant change
must be quickly incorporated into the PMS.
Reporting earned value against an outdated
plan is useless at best. It can be worse than
useless ifsomeone believes data that isblind-
ly cranked out,based on an outdated plan. If
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Figure 1. Sample Trend Chart
the data is current, a PMS can help you de-
tect the trouble spots sooner and, therefore,
direct your problem-solving energies more
efficiently.
As with automated scheduling systems, PMS
is not a panacea for the managers. You have
to keep track of the big picture, and above
all, use good old common sense.
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